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1. Introduction  
Many interpretations concerning the rise of mass primary schooling in Europe highlight the 
role of top-down reforms associated with nation-building efforts (Melton, 1988; Green, 
1990; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). The French Ferry laws of 1880s and the 19th-century 
German leadership in primary education are prime examples of this phenomenon. Indeed, 
Paglayan (2020) suggested that democracy played a minor role in the early expansion of 
primary education. She argued that non-democratic regimes promoted schooling for 
several reasons, such as to foster industrialization, increase military strength, forge national 
identity and promote political loyalty. As a result, in many countries, “a majority of the 
population already had access to primary schooling before democratizing” (p. 17). Other 
authors, by contrast, have suggested that democracy played a key role in primary education 
expansion (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000; Go and Lindert, 2010; Engerman et al., 2009). 
In fact, Lindert (2004) considered that to explain some of the paradoxes in the history of 
education concerning the effect of democracy, top-down reform theories need to be 
qualified and supplemented with careful analysis of the role of (de)centralization and the 
actual distribution of political voice. For example, according to this author, the progress of 
primary education in 19th-century Prussia was the result not of the imperial government, 
but of a decentralized system, which granted rapidly urbanizing territories enough political 
voice to make generous investments in education (Lindert, 2004). A similar logic could be 
applied to formally democratic countries. Specific aspects related to the organization of the 
educational system or to political dynamics could affect the actual distribution of political 
voice and reduce politicians’ incentives to invest in education. Specifically, this paper 
discusses the potential impact of imperfections in political markets on the spread of 
schooling by examining the allocation of primary education spending across Spanish 
provinces in 1902-22. 
The Spanish case is interesting for several reasons. First, like other European countries, 
Spain launched a top-down education reform shortly after the turn of the 20th century. 
During the Cuban War of Independence in 1898, Spain suffered a resounding defeat at the 
hands of the United States. As a result of this Desastre del 98, the desire for reform and to 
put an end to Spain’s degeneration and backwardness increased and a new political and 
intellectual movement, Regenerationism (Regeneracionismo), emerged. Many blamed the 
defeat on ignorance. Santiago Alba, Minister of Education in 1912 and 1918, said in 1901 
that it was not the US soldiers but “the Yankee school, rational, human, [and] flourishing (…) 
that defeated the Spanish school, primitive, routine, [and] poor” (cited in Villares and 
Moreno Luzón, 2009, p. 328). As in France after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the 
military defeat paved the way for education reform. Thus, in 1900, the government created 
the Ministry of Education and, in 1902, took over payment of primary school teachers’ 
salaries and the purchase of school supplies. These measures were inspired largely by the 
French Ferry laws of 1880s, but the Spanish results were much poorer. Literacy rates 
increased gradually, but even in 1920, 39% of the population was illiterate and major 
regional differences persisted. 
Secondly, the Spanish education reforms were implemented under a semi-democratic 
regime. During the Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923), Spain was officially a democracy. 
However, electoral fraud, corruption and widespread political patronage enabled the 
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political elite to largely ignore bottom-up demands. The system was dominated by two main 
parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, which had agreed to alternate in power by 
means of rigged elections. Before each election, the two ruling parties planned a provisional 
electoral result in which the incoming party always obtained a majority in Parliament. This 
national agreement was then implemented by local elites in their districts through 
widespread client-patron relationships, or by means of massive vote buying and outright 
intimidation.  
Local elites, in fact, played a crucial role in this system. They acted as intermediaries 
between the public resources offered by national members of parliament (MPs) to buy 
electoral support and local communities or individuals. This gave local elites a great deal of 
power, and national MPs often had to negotiate with them to ensure that the prearranged 
electoral results were successfully implemented (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). 
Despite its corrupt nature, this system allowed for some political stability, but it weakened 
over time. In urban areas in particular, elections became increasingly competitive and the 
candidates of the dynastic parties (Conservatives and Liberals) gradually lost ground in 
favor of those from emerging parties. Additionally, since the two ruling parties found it more 
difficult to control the electoral results, and thus ensure that their candidates were elected, 
political patronage and the influence of local elites in national politics increased. Some 
national MPs decided to reinforce their clientelist ties with local elites to ensure that they 
were elected (or re-elected), and the so-called candidatos propios (candidates who were 
repeatedly elected in the same electoral district outside of the alternation system) gradually 
increased.  
To analyze the impact of these political factors on primary education spending, we used a 
historical dataset that included both electoral outcomes and the distribution of central 
government education spending across Spanish provinces in 1902-1922. The period 
comprises the years between the 1902 education reform and the coup d’état led by Primo 
de Rivera in 1923, which put an end to the Bourbon Restoration. The empirical approach 
exploits the variation in the share of candidates from emerging parties and the share of 
propios across Spanish provinces and over time to evaluate the impact of the electoral 
competition (or lack thereof), political patronage and voter turnout. 
Our results reveal the following. First, the national government lowered primary education 
investment in provinces with a high share of elected candidates from non-dynastic parties. 
However, this effect was non-linear. In more industrialized areas and in provinces where 
the share of candidates from emerging parties was particularly high, the government did in 
fact increase education spending. In line with Curto et al. (2012), we interpreted this as the 
result of the regime’s strategy to achieve political stability. The ruling duopoly initially 
punished the opposition provinces as a way of enforcing the alternation system, but later, 
when opposition increased, the government tried to appeal to these provinces for the sake 
of political stability. This is consistent with the expected behavior of a semi-democratic 
regime (Robinson and Torvik, 2009). Second, the share of propios had a negative effect on 
education spending, thus suggesting that political clientelism hindered education expansion 
in Spain. This is consistent with theories predicting that clientelist policies lead to the 
underprovision of non-targeted goods (e.g., universal primary education) and the 
overprovision of targeted goods (e.g., public jobs and public works projects) (Keefer, 2007). 
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Third, voter turnout had a positive effect, but it was not enough to compensate for the 
negative influence of political patronage and the lack of political competition. 
Shortly after the turn of the century, nation-building reformers in Spain attempted to 
stimulate schooling expansion to improve, or at least dignify, Spain’s position in the 
international arena. However, we show that democratic imperfections, primarily the lack of 
effective political competition and widespread political clientelism, can explain the modest 
spread of primary schooling after the 1902 reforms. This means that the arguments posed 
by Paglayan (2020) may explain the timing of the reform. But, as Lindert (2004) indicates, 
to understand the final outcome of the reform it is necessary to take into account the role of 
political voice and democracy. 
These findings, therefore, contribute to existing debates on the role of democracy in the 
early expansion of primary education. Moreover, instead of focusing on non-democratic 
regimes with rapid educational expansion (such as Prussia), our paper focuses on a semi-
democratic regime with poorer educational outcomes to analyze the impact of democratic 
shortcomings on education expansion. Our paper is also the first to analyze the influence of 
political dynamics on public primary education spending during the Restoration in Spain. 
Previous studies have typically focused on economic or institutional factors, such as land 
inequality and access to common land (Beltrán Tapia and Martínez-Galarraga, 2018; 
Beltrán-Tapia, 2013) or have been more descriptive in nature (Beltrán-Tapia et al., 2019; 
Núñez, 1992; Pérez Moreda, 1997). In that respect, the democratic shortcomings that we 
identify may also have implications for the debates around the slow economic growth that 
took place during the Restoration (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1997; Prados de la Escosura 
and Rosés, 2010). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the theoretical framework; 
Section 3 describes the educational system and political setting of early 20th-century Spain; 
Section 4 presents the data and methodological approach; Section 5 outlines the results of 
the econometric analysis; and, lastly, Section 6 offers a conclusion. 
 
2. The rise of primary schooling: potential explanations 
There is currently no consensus on the relationship between democracy and education. 
Several studies have emphasized the importance of democracy and the extension of voting 
rights to generate broad demand for schooling expansion (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000; Go 
and Lindert, 2010; Engerman et al., 2009). However, other accounts on the rise of modern 
education have focused on the role of top-down reforms implemented by political elites for 
nation-building purposes (Melton, 1988; Green, 1990; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). Paglayan 
(2020) suggested that non-democratic regimes may show an interest in schooling 
expansion to foster industrialization, increase military strength, forge national identity or 
promote political loyalty. This would, in turn, explain why primary school expansion has 
often preceded the full consolidation of democracy. 
To explain the apparent discord between scholars who associate schooling spread with 
either top-down reforms or democracy, Lindert (2004) stated that the discussion needs to 
go hand in hand with a reassessment of the role of (de)centralization. In non-democratic 
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Prussia, for example, decentralization granted political voice to rapidly urbanizing regions 
with a high demand for education. This made it possible to quickly expand primary 
schooling (in this areas) and overcome the opposition of Junker-dominated areas. 1 
Conversely, in countries like France and, above all, Italy, where regions with a low demand 
for education or poor fiscal capacity were in the majority, decentralization led to poorer 
schooling outcomes. The extension of voting rights in this context had a modest positive 
effect. It was centralization, together with existing voting rights, that ultimately gave rise to 
schooling expansion (Lindert, 2004; Cappelli, 2016a, 2016b; Cappelli and Vasta, 2020). 
Chaudhary et al. (2012) also showed that decentralization and the lack of broad political 
voice in developing countries, particularly Brazil, Russia, India and China, led local elites to 
capture political institutions and delay the expansion of primary education. 
More generally, the attitude of powerful local lobbies towards mass schooling has been the 
subject of widespread discussion. Recent empirical analyses have suggested that political 
elites, particularly landed elites, boosted the expansion of education in the 19th century in 
Sweden and Austria (Andersson and Berger, 2019; Cvrcek and Zajicek, 2019). Other studies, 
however, are less optimistic about the effect of strong landed elites. Cinnirella and Hornung 
(2016) and Beltrán Tapia and Martínez-Galarraga (2018), for example, considered that land 
inequality negatively affected the demand for education. Galor et al. (2009) and Goñi (2018) 
also found a negative correlation between land inequality and schooling, but highlighted the 
role of supply-side factors, namely the opposition of landed elites to education reforms. 
Other studies have analyzed the relationship between democracy and the provision of 
public goods, but have focused on the influence of political motivations rather than 
centralization or special interests. Keefer and Khemani (2005) and Keefer (2007) showed 
that governments that rely on clientelist practices tend to overprovide targeted goods (such 
as public works projects and public jobs) to narrow groups of voters and to underprovide 
non-targeted goods (such as universal healthcare and education). This is because patrons 
have weak incentives to provide general public goods to benefit clients and non-clients 
alike. It is interesting to note in that respect that Curto et al. (2012) found that clientelist 
politics played a crucial role in road investment allocations in Spain in 1880-1914.  
Keefer and Khemani (2005) also accounted for the importance of electoral party 
competition for the provision of public goods. In the absence of credible opposition parties, 
the incumbent party can win elections with exceedingly modest promises. Competition, by 
contrast, may lead to the higher provision of public goods and a reduction in political 
patronage if the competing political parties are able to make credible promises to broad 
segments of the population in search of electoral support. The authors supported their 
claims with evidence from contemporary India. However, there is also historical evidence 
that points in the same direction. Eli and Salisbury (2016), for example, found that the 
expansion of pensions for Confederate veterans and widows in the southern United States 
during the 1920s occurred in counties where Democratic candidates were threatened by 
alternative parties in elections. 
The discussion on political motivations to allocate public goods is related to the field of 
distributive politics or “pork barrel” models. Based on the original contributions by Cox and 
                                                          
1 In the US, decentralization also allowed regions with high demand for education to rapidly expand schooling 
in the 19th century (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Go and Lindert, 2010). 
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McCubbins (1986) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), a wide range of studies have discussed 
whether politicians target public goods towards their core constituencies or those with a 
majority of swing voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Political parties can target their core 
voters to mobilize their electoral base and minimize the loss of voters who have weak 
partisan attachments (Cox, 2010). On the other hand, they can address voters whose future 
support is uncertain, i.e., voters who are ideologically weakly opposed to the relevant party 
(Stokes, 2005). Most of these studies analyze infrastructure and local transfers worldwide.2 
Along similar lines, the distribution of public funds might well reflect the influence of 
individual MPs, who seek to reinforce their electorate support. In this case, benefits could 
flow to relevant figures whose support may be crucial in overcoming majority requirements 
in the legislative process (Cox, 2009). 
The core and swing voter hypotheses have been developed for democratic contexts, in 
which political parties have to compete for the support of the electorate. Nonetheless, 
Robinson and Torvik (2009) expanded this general framework to semi-democratic contexts 
in which standard democratic strategies to gather political support, such as public goods 
provision and redistribution to potential voters, are combined with coercion and violence. 
In these political contexts, swing voters are able to attract more public resources and 
generate more public goods provision only when the government is unable or unwilling to 
successfully implement coercive methods. Again, Curto et al. (2012) found that in 
Restoration Spain the government used road investment allocations to punish provinces 
that elected candidates outside the alternation system. However, during the last few years 
of the 19th century, when political and social mobilization increased, this strategy was 
abandoned and “swing” (or rebel) provinces were in fact favored for the sake of political 
stability.  
Our contribution to this debate was to study whether the strategies developed by politicians 
to hold electoral support conditioned the spread of schooling under the centralized system 
implemented by the Restoration regime in Spain at the turn of the 20th century. To our 
knowledge, few studies have analyzed the disruptive influence of politics on the expansion 
of education. In Azar (forthcoming) the effect of political tactics on school provision is 
documented for Uruguay during the first half of the 20th century.  Another case –albeit not 
entirely analogous- is the study conducted by Cinnirella and Schueler (2018), who found 
that the vote share of pro-nationalist parties was boosted by the increase in primary 
education spending in Imperial Germany. 
3. Historical background 
3.1. The education system 
Spain’s first national education law, the so-called Moyano Law, was passed in 1857. It was 
inspired largely by the French Guizot Law of 1833. Education was divided into primary, 
secondary and university levels. A clear distinction between public schools (funded with 
public resources) and private schools (funded by private individuals or institutions) was 
established. Schooling was declared compulsory for children between the ages of six and 
nine and was free of charge for poor families. To benefit from free schooling, a certificate 
                                                          
2 For a survey on the literature on distributive politics, see Golden and Min (2013). 
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issued by the local authorities was required. The definition of “poor,” however, seems to 
have been quite broad, as schooling was free for more than half of children by 1860. 
The new legislation required local governments to set up a minimum number of schools, 
depending on population size (Núñez, 1991, 1992).3 Primary enrollment rates increased 
gradually from 1860 but progress was rather slow: percentages were 36% in 1860, 47% in 
1878 and even in 1900, they were below 45% and a far cry from European standards 
(Núñez, 1992, p. 294).4 Moreover, this rather modest increase in literacy occurred mainly 
in areas that already had relatively high literacy rates, such that preexisting regional 
disparities in literacy rates actually increased under the Moyano Law (Beltrán-Tapia et al., 
2019). A snapshot of literacy rates across Spanish provinces in 1900 (Map 1) shows a clear 
divide between the northern half of the country, which had above-average literacy rates 
(with the exception of Galicia in the northwestern corner), and the Mediterranean coast, 
especially the southern provinces, which presented lower rates. 
 Map 1 here  
The Moyano Law established nationwide regulations, but funding remained a local 
responsibility. As a result, schooling expansion was concentrated in areas where local 
governments were able (or willing) to raise enough taxes to fund primary education. In this 
regard, Beltrán-Tapia (2013) showed that the persistence of common land, which 
contributed to both municipal and household income, led to higher levels of education 
spending. It is also likely that the average size of the local population conditioned school 
provision because of the way the law was designed. Since the Moyano Law required that at 
least one school be created in the smallest municipalities, school provision increased in 
areas where small towns were predominant, such as north-central Spain (Pérez Moreda, 
1997). Local demand for schooling should also have been shaped by the economic activities 
typical of each region. Thus, one would expect that traditional agricultural areas were less 
interested in developing mass schooling than industrialized, urban and commercial regions 
(Núñez, 1992; Pérez Moreda, 1997).  
As mentioned in the introduction, the Desastre del 98 paved the way for education reform. 
For many, education became the key to economic progress and political and social 
regeneration. As expressed by writer Emilia Pardo Bazán in 1901, “Our problem is a 
problem of education and culture”; this was a widespread opinion among both the general 
public and the policymakers of the Restoration regime. Until then, schooling debates had 
focused mainly on ideological issues related to academic freedom and secularization 
(Villares and Moreno Luzón, 2009; Otero, 2018).  
After the Desastre, the liberals embraced the program reform devised by the Institución 
Libre de Enseñanza. This was an influential institution established in 1876 that advocated 
                                                          
3 Municipalities with fewer than 500 inhabitants were required to maintain at least one incomplete school. 
Municipalities with more than 500 inhabitants had to maintain at least one complete school for boys and one 
incomplete school for girls. Municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants had to maintain two complete 
schools for boys and two for girls, a proportion that would be progressively expanded. Complete schools had to 
be run by teachers with a formal academic degree, whereas incomplete schools could be run by “any person of 
legal age, able to read and write, and of good manners,” requirements often fulfilled by the parish priest (Núñez, 
1992, p. 256). 
4 As early as 1870, several European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK) had literacy rates of between 70% and 80% of the adult population (Crafts, 1997). 
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for urgent reforms to change the organization, methods and curricula of the school system 
and move towards secularization. Some factions of the Conservative Party also committed 
to similar reforms, such that, rather than being a fight between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, the battle over schooling turned into a dispute between reform supporters from 
both ideologies and Catholics groups (Moreno Luzón, 2001). At the turn of the century, the 
government created the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Instrucción Pública y Bellas 
Artes). One year later, in 1901, the upper age for compulsory schooling was extended from 
nine to 12 years. In 1902, the national government took over payment of primary school 
teachers’ salaries and the purchase of school supplies, in line with the example set by the 
French Ferry laws. The construction and maintenance of schools, however, remained the 
responsibility of local governments.  
Average primary education spending per capita across Spanish provinces increased by 
almost 70% between 1902 and 1922 (from 1.72 to 2.91 constant pesetas). Literacy rates 
increased more gradually (Table 1). The modernization of the Spanish economy probably 
contributed to this process, as urbanization generated greater demand for education. 
However, progress was rather slow and remained a far cry from European standards. In 
1920, the Spanish literacy rate among the adult population was 61.1%, while the literacy 
rate in countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden had already 
exceeded 80% by 1870. Moreover, Table 1 shows that these poor results were accompanied 
by a huge gender gap (Beltrán-Tapia et al., 2019). 
Table 1. Literacy rates in Spain, 1860-1920 (%) 
Year Male Female Total 
1860 41.7 11.9 26.5 
1877 46.7 19.3 32.5 
1887 52.1 24.9 38.1 
1900 57.1 33.3 44.8 
1910 62.9 42.3 52.2 
1920 70.1 52.9 61.1 
Source: Beltrán-Tapia et al. (2019) 
Regional disparities also persisted after centralization. Map 2 shows the Spanish literacy 
rates in 1920. Even if there was some convergence in the cases of Galicia and Barcelona, for 
example, there was still a clear divide between the northern provinces (with high literacy 
rates) and the southern provinces and Mediterranean coast (with low literacy rates). 
Apparently, this situation persisted until the Second Republic (1931-36), when the 
government launched an ambitious primary education policy that reduced the existing 
imbalances (Núñez, 1991). 
 Map 2 here  
A look at the distribution of central government expenditure per capita on primary 
education across Spanish provinces between 1905 and 1920 shows the same regional split 
observed in the case of literacy (Map 3). Despite the average increase in primary education 
spending, the northern half of the country (except for Galicia) showed higher levels of 
education spending than the Mediterranean coast and southern regions. It seems, therefore, 
that the centralization process initiated in 1902 did not lead to regional convergence in 
terms of the allocation of schooling resources. The north-south divide persisted and there 
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was even some homogenization among southern provinces at low spending levels. The 
objective of this paper is to analyze whether political factors can help explain the limited 
impact of the 1902 reforms. Before doing so, it is important to summarize the main features 
of the Spanish political system at the time. 
 Map 3 here  
3.2. Political context 
In 1874, a parliamentary monarchy under the Bourbon dynasty was established in Spain 
and led to the so-called Restoration period (1874–1923). In the preceding decades, 
particularly since the start of Isabella II’s reign in 1833, military coups, or pronunciamientos, 
had been common. Since massive electoral fraud prevented any political alternation in 
government, political leaders in the opposition often relied on the military to organize plots 
to overthrow the government (Sabaté et al., forthcoming).  
During the Restoration period, the two main parties (the Conservatives and Liberals), or 
“dynastic parties”, agreed to alternate in power by means of fraudulent elections, the so-
called turno pacífico (“peaceful turn”). The role of the Crown was to give the system support 
and stability. Anti-liberal sectors of the Catholic right and groups of leftist republicans and 
revolutionaries were excluded from the alternation system. This design created some 
political stability, but it came at the price of widespread corruption and limited political 
competition. It worked as follows. Before each election, the incoming and incumbent parties 
came together to plan the preliminary distribution of the chamber seats, which always gave 
the former the victory. This national agreement, or encasillado, had to be implemented by 
the local elites on election day. 
Several mechanisms were used to enforce the encasillado. Massive vote buying was 
common practice and increased substantially after the introduction of universal male 
suffrage in 1890. Fraudulent activities, such as manipulation of the electoral census, and 
outright intimidation, which was particularly effective in areas where the labor market was 
close to monopsony, were also frequent. However, the main source of political control arose 
from widespread political patronage. Local bosses, or caciques, were crucial to this end. 
They acted as intermediaries between national MPs and their local communities by 
providing their clients with access to public resources. Given the nature of the Restoration 
system, national leaders often had to negotiate with local elites to implement the 
prearranged electoral results. In turn, these close ties with national leaders increased the 
political influence of local bosses.  
The political power of the caciques lay more in their control over administrative 
mechanisms than in their privileged economic position, although the two factors were often 
linked (Comín, 1988; Moreno-Luzón, 2007). Their social profile varied from region to 
region. Landowners, for example, were predominant in the south and west (Andalusia, 
Extremadura and parts of Castile). Mid-sized farmers were common in Valencia, in the east. 
Professionals, particularly lawyers, who had good knowledge of the administrative system, 
played a leading role in regions such as Catalonia and Galicia. Finally, merchants and 
shipowners were very active in Valencia, Seville and Cadiz, and industrialists were 
predominant in Catalonia (Moreno-Luzón, 2007).  
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From the beginning of the Restoration period, the local elites in some electoral districts 
established long-term relationships with their corresponding MPs to ensure that they were 
elected or re-elected without respecting the electoral turn. These MPs were known as 
propios, as they were said to “own” an electoral district and were continually elected 
independently of their party affiliation (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). This behavior was initially 
more common where propios proved to be particularly effective in obtaining resources for 
the elites’ clientele. This increased their chances of being re-elected and boosted the 
influence of local elites in national politics.  
This governing scheme operated rather successfully until the end of the 19th century. 
However, social unrest at the turn of the 20th century expedited the demand for political 
change. In 1907, the Conservative government implemented an electoral reform. Voting was 
declared compulsory, with sanctions devised for civil servants who did not vote, although 
this was rarely enforced. To prevent fraud and manipulation, mayors were removed from 
polling stations, the Supreme Court was made responsible for checking the electoral results 
and independent electoral boards were created.  
Additionally, Article 29 established that no elections would take place in districts with only 
one candidate, who would automatically win the election. This peculiar electoral rule, 
initially conceived to stimulate political participation, had the opposite effect and led to the 
election of more than a quarter of the total number of MPs elected between 1910 and 1923. 
In any case, the 1907 reform did not introduce greater proportionality, which would have 
benefited emerging parties, and electoral districts remained very small, which benefited the 
local bosses and led to the persistence of clientelist practices.  
In addition to these subtle changes, a number of historical events fueled the emergence of 
deep-rooted political and social conflicts. The Restoration system weakened over time due 
to both external factors (namely, the emergence of new parties, especially in urban areas) 
and internal factors (the gradual strengthening of the local elites) (Villares and Moreno 
Luzón, 2009). 
According to Comín (1988), the abovementioned national identity crisis provoked by the 
Desastre del 98 represented a major turning point  in the Restoration period. However, the 
Tragic Week of 1909, which plunged Barcelona into violent anticlerical riots, and the 
discrepancies over Spain’s neutrality during the First World War, which led to additional 
ruptures between pro-Allies and pro-German factions, were also key events. In 1917, in the 
midst of the armed conflict, growing military discontent over poor pay conditions caused a 
government crisis. This, alongside increased political mobilization by leftist republicans and 
Catalan nationalists and the labor movement, led to the worst crisis faced by the Restoration 
regime since its creation (Villares and Moreno Luzón, 2009).  
From 1918 onwards, the government found it increasingly difficult to obtain a 
parliamentary majority. Legislative representatives were renewed every year in 1918, 1919 
and 1920, respectively, as opposed to the two-year terms that had been the general rule in 
previous years. In fact, after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890, the average 
voter turnout across provinces ranged from 68% to 74% and voters slowly began to be 
persuaded by the ideological arguments of minority parties like the republicans, the Catalan 
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nationalists and the socialists, who won parliamentary representation for the first time in 
1910.  
In this context of increasingly competitive elections, minority parties gained more influence 
and, more importantly, encouraged modern political behavior.5 As Moreno-Luzón (2007) 
put it, the rise of these parties meant “the arrival of the masses in the political arena” (p. 
431). Especially after the First World War, the traditional methods that were predominant 
in rural areas coexisted alongside the modern political behavior seen mostly in industrial 
cities, although fraud and political patronage remained widespread until the collapse of the 
Restoration regime in 1923. Figure 1 shows how the share of MPs of dynastic parties 
remaining in the opposition increased after 1907, thus reflecting the difficulties associated 
with reaching a consensus on the distribution of MPs. By the end of the period, over 45% of 
MPs belonged to the dynastic opposition or to minority parties.  
 Figure 1 here  
After the increasing politicization in cities, the main factor behind the deterioration of the 
Restoration system was the gradual strengthening of local elites. With the crisis of the 
dynastic parties, a growing number of MPs looked for the protection of local powers “…in 
order not to be swept away by the instability of the government” (Moreno-Luzón, 2007: 
435). This led to an increase in the share of propios in Parliament (who, as previously 
mentioned, were continually elected independently of their party affiliation, without 
respecting the electoral turn). Our computations show that they grew from 40% in 1901 to 
49% in 1922 and 57% in 1919. This compounded the difficulties of the post-First World 
War political instability and reflected the deterioration of the Restoration system until it 
was finally overthrown by the military coup led by Primo de Rivera in 1923.6 Map A-1 in the 
Appendix shows that propios were distributed throughout the territory. Their presence, 
associated with different types of local bosses, or caciques, was common in most provinces 
during the period.  
4. Empirical approach  
To analyze the influence of the Spanish semi-democratic regime on primary schooling 
investment following the 1902 reforms, we exploit changes in political factors resulting 
from the gradual breakdown of the Spanish Restoration system. In particular, we consider: 
i) changes in electoral competition and ii) changes in the spread of political clientelism 
across provinces and over time. Changes in electoral competition are approximated by the 
variation in the political representation of opposition parties, which is an indication of the 
government’s ability to implement the prearranged electoral results and therefore limit 
electoral competition. To examine the impact of political clientelism, we focus on differences 
in the share of propios at the local level. Remember that these were MPs who established 
particularly stable patron-client relationships with local bosses. Our starting hypothesis is 
that the lack of electoral competition and widespread political clientelism lowered the 
                                                          
5 Basque nationalists, Carlists and traditionalists also became politically relevant in the Basque Country and 
Navarre. However, as shown in the following sections, our analysis excludes these provinces because of a lack 
of data. 
6 See Section 4 for more details on the precise definition used in the calculations. 
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central government’s spending on primary education at the local level. The basic model to 
be estimated is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡           (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  stands for the central government’s spending on primary education in province 
(i) and year (t); 𝑃𝑖𝑡 includes our political variables; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 stands for a set of control variables; 
𝛼𝑖 are province fixed effects; 𝑡 are time fixed effects and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is an error term. 
In the specifications, we assumed that central government spending on education in one 
given year was influenced by the current legislature and, therefore, by the results of the 
nearest previous election. Consequently, the value of the political variables is the same 
within each legislative term. Fixed effects at the province level control for unobserved local 
characteristics that are constant over time, such as geographic, institutional and cultural 
features. Therefore, we identify the effect of political variables through within-province 
variation over time instead of between-province sectional variation. Likewise, year fixed 
effects capture unobserved external changes over time that affect all provinces, such as 
national budget constraints or extensions that are decided centrally. The potential non-
independence of errors within departments are tackled by clustering standard errors at the 
province level.  
Data on the provincial distribution of central government spending on primary education 
were obtained from the Spanish general state budgets (Presupuestos Generales del Estado 
and Cuentas Generales del Estado), which indicate the outlays by province on both personnel 
and material (personnel accounted for 89% of the total).7 From 1917 onwards, however, 
the general state budgets offer aggregated figures for Spain only as a whole. In this case, the 
information was obtained from Spain’s statistical yearbooks, which also include 
information on central government outlays on primary education disaggregated at the 
province level for those years. Where there was a discrepancy between the total amount 
reported in the Spanish general state budgets and the statistical yearbooks, we retained the 
total figure reported in the budgets and the same distribution across provinces reported in 
the statistical yearbooks. Data for 1921 were missing and were therefore interpolated. The 
Basque Country and Navarre were excluded from the analysis, as their education 
expenditure was financed and executed directly at the provincial level. Our new database, 
therefore, consists of a total of 45 provinces. The time period starts in 1902, when the 
central government took over primary schooling expenditure, and ends in 1922, before the 
Restoration broke up. The amounts are expressed in constant pesetas per capita at 1914 
prices. The information about provincial population was taken from Roses et al. (2010) and 
interpolated to fill in the gaps. 
As for the political factors (𝑃𝑖𝑡), we consider a set of variables. To capture the effect of the 
increasing political competition for each legislative term, we classify all MPs according to 
their membership to one of the two dynastic parties (Liberals or Conservatives) or to any 
of the minority parties (e.g., left-wing republicans, right-wing traditionalists, Catalan 
nationalists and socialists). We then calculate the share of MPs belonging to minority parties 
                                                          
7 The Presupuestos Generales del Estado are passed by the government and include all budgeted expenditure. 
The Cuentas Generales del Estado are drafted at the end of the financial year and include all budgeted expenditure 
plus settled and executed expenditure. In 1918-20, the Presupuestos Generales were unavailable, so we obtained 
the data from the Cuentas Generales. 
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and the share of MPs belonging to the dynastic opposition (e.g., the share of Liberals or 
Conservatives remaining in the opposition) in each province.8 During the period of analysis, 
the Liberals held government in 1901-1902, 1905-1906, 1910-1913 and 1916-1918.9 In the 
remaining years, they were the dynastic opposition party. Obviously, the opposite was true 
for the Conservatives. Data on the affiliation of MPs for the period 1902-1914 were obtained 
from Curto et al. (2012). Information for subsequent years was taken from Varela (2001), 
who compiled the name, district and party of all MPs. The missing data were filled in from 
the website of the Spanish Historical Archive of the Congress of Deputies, which also 
provides the name and district of all elected MPs. 10 
The expected sign of the share of minority and dynastic opposition MPs points in two 
different directions. As discussed in Section 2, one would initially expect increased political 
competition to have a positive impact on education spending. However, in semi-democratic 
contexts such as the Restoration system, coercive methods may allow governments to 
ignore swing voters’ demands and lower redistribution in their favor (Robinson and Torvik, 
2009). Thus, our starting hypothesis is that, in the election years when the ruling duopoly 
successfully implemented the alternation system, the emergence of new parties was 
detrimental to education spending. This is because the government was able to ignore 
voters in swing constituencies and focus on core voters. However, it is also likely that, as the 
regime weakened and minority parties increasingly gained ground, the government had an 
incentive to replace this punishment strategy with one of attraction. As mentioned before, 
this seems to have occurred in the case of road construction (Curto et al., 2012).  
To test whether the government changed its strategy as the opposition increased, we 
modified our baseline equation to allow for a potential non-linear relationship between 
education expenditure and increasing political opposition. Thus, the analysis also included 
both the share of minority party MPs and the share of dynastic opposition MPs squared.  
Another relevant political variable in our analysis is the presence of propios. As mentioned 
in previous sections, propios were MPs with close links to local bosses as a result of 
particularly fruitful and long-standing clientelist relationships. As in Curto et al. (2012), we 
defined propios as MPS who: i) had been elected in the past in the same district, ii) belonged 
to one of the dynastic parties and iii) had sat with the opposition for at least one term (that 
is, they did not conform to the alternation system). Our calculations consider the continuity 
of these MPs from 1901 onwards. As before, the data came from Varela (2001) and the 
website of the Historical Archive of the Congress of Deputies. The expected sign of this 
                                                          
8 It is worth noting that provinces were composed of more than one electoral district. This means that when we 
calculated the share of MPs belonging to each party at the province level, we in fact aggregated the information 
and probably smoothed potential local variation (existing at the district level). This might have led to 
measurement errors, but the information on education spending provided by government records is 
disaggregated at the province level only, thus making this aggregation unavoidable. Moreover, there are reasons 
to believe that this aggregation causes relatively minor problems. It seems that provinces were fairly consistent 
key political units in the Restoration system (Moreno-Luzón, 2007, p. 435). Before each election, for example, 
the Minister of the Interior used to provide the provincial governors with the list of candidates who should be 
elected in their districts according to the Encasillado. If provinces were indeed relevant political units to ensure 
the Restoration regime worked, this would help reduce the problems associated with aggregation. 
9 In 1901, 1905 and 1910, the Liberals won the elections and formed stable governments that lasted for the 
whole term. However, after 1917, incumbent governments were often forced to resign and national 
governments comprising liberals and conservatives became common. In these cases, we consider the dynastic 
opposition party to be the party that initially lost the election.  
10 See https://www.congreso.es/web/guest/historico-diputados 
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variable is negative, as we do not expect propios to have an incentive to struggle for 
education resources that, unlike public works, for example, would benefit both clients and 
non-clients. 
Our estimates also account for the relative seniority of MPs. This variable indicates the 
difference between the maximum seniority in the legislative term and that of each MP, 
measured as the number of legislative terms for which he had been elected.11 Since seniority 
could be the result of a leadership position in the corresponding party and could also lead 
to better access to information and state officials, we would initially expect more senior MPs 
to be in a better position to obtain public funding for their provinces. However, it is also true 
that in a context of widespread political patronage such as Restoration Spain, senior MPs 
may have had little incentive to use their presumably increased capacity to attract resources 
to improve schooling provision, which, as mentioned above, would benefit both clients and 
non-clients. 
Voter turnout is also included to test whether growing political participation translated into 
higher primary education spending. It is computed as the ratio between the total number of 
votes and the potential electorate at the province level, based on the number of people on 
the electoral register. As already mentioned, from 1910 onwards, voting was not required 
in districts where only one candidate was running for election, in accordance with Article 
29. Therefore, our voter turnout computations only took account of districts in which 
elections were actually held. We included as an additional variable the share of MPs who 
entered Parliament through Article 29 in each province. The information was obtained from 
Martínez Cuadrado (1969). Where there were information gaps or minor incongruities, the 
information was checked and completed with the Spanish statistical yearbooks, which also 
provide information disaggregated at the province level on electoral results from 1916 
onwards, and the website of the Historical Archive of the Congress of Deputies. Regretfully, 
these data are available from 1907 onwards only. Information for 1914 and 1915 is also 
missing. Initially, the expected sign of this variable is positive, although fraud may have 
played a role in reducing the potential positive effect of electoral participation in the context 
of the Spanish Restoration. 
Finally, we include a set of controls to capture other factors that influenced the allocation of 
education spending across provinces. We compute the share of school-age children between 
five and 15 years old over the total population and the population density (i.e., population 
per square km) at the province level. We also include the share of older people (above 60 
years old) over the total. These variables take account of the different competing interests 
for public funding according to the age structure and the distribution of the population 
throughout the territory. The information on total population, and its composition by age 
bracket, at the local level was retrieved from the national census (1900, 1910 and 1920) 
and interpolated to fill in time gaps. Data on province area were obtained from Díez-
Minguela et al. (2016). Adult literacy rates (lagged 10 years) were also included to control 
for parents’ level of education and the “cultural setting.” GDP per capita was used to 
measure the economic development of each province. We expected richer, more educated 
                                                          




𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝑛=1  where 𝑇𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥: the maximum number of times an MP had been 
elected until period t; 𝑇𝑛,𝑖,𝑡: the number of times an MP n in province i in election year t had previously been 
elected. N: the total number of MPs at the province level in year t (Curto et al., 2012). 
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regions to have higher education demands. GDP per capita was taken from Rosés et al. 
(2010) and literacy data from Núñez (1992). Finally, we use the share of the labor force 
employed in non-rural activities (i.e., manufacturing and services) to account for the higher 
demand for human capital envisaged in non-rural contexts. The idea is that skilled labor 
was not a prime requirement in agricultural societies but became increasingly relevant as 
urbanization and non-rural activities grew (Lindert, 2004). This variable was taken from 
Rosés et al. (2010). Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the panel. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Education exp. p. capita (1914 pesetas) 945 1.79 0.82 0.38 6.18 
Share minority seats/total 945 0.11 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Share dynastic opposition seats/total 945 0.29 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Share propios/total 945 0.44 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Relative seniority  945 3.34 1.98 0.36 8.00 
Voter turnout 617 0.71 0.09 0.46 0.87 
Share of MPs Art. 29/total 945 0.17 0.25 0.00 1.00 
GDP/1000 p. capita (1914 pesetas) 945 0.60 0.27 0.21 2.57 
Population density (pop./sq. km) 945 45.83 29.80 14.69 184.13 
Adult literacy rates (lagged 10 years) 945 46.56 16.69 20.18 104.82* 
School-age children over total pop. 945 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.39 
Older people over total pop.  945 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.12 
Share of non-rural employment (services & 
manufacturing) 
945 0.30 0.14 0.07 0.91 
Notes: *Adult literacy rates are calculated by using the population over 10 years old as a proxy for the adult 
population. Values above 100 suggest that some children under 10 were literate. See Núñez (1992), p. 94. 
5. Results  
Table 3 summarizes the results of the baseline specification. Columns 1 and 2 indicate the 
estimates of a first set of political variables, excluding voter turnout, for which the number 
of observations was much smaller. Column 2 includes our set of control variables. In both 
cases, the share of minority party seats shows a negative and significant effect. It seems that 
the government was able to ignore the demands of less loyal constituencies and to focus on 
the more loyal ones, a finding consistent with the expected behavior of a semi-democratic 
regime such as the Spanish Restoration. Moreover, as stated in Curto et al. (2012), it is likely 
that the government implemented this punishment strategy to give opposition 
constituencies an incentive to join the alternation system.  
The share of propios also shows a negative and statistically significant effect. That is, 
primary education outlays were lower in provinces where clientelism was more 
widespread and MPs had closer ties to local bosses. This suggests that propios had little 
incentive to pressure for primary education spending that would benefit both their clients 
and non-clients. Interestingly, in their study on road spending, also during the Spanish 
Restoration, Curto et al. (2012) found that propios had a strong positive effect on road 




Table 3. Political determinants of primary public education expenditure  
Dependent variable  Primary education exp. per capita (constant pesetas) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Share minority seats -0.526*** -0.445*** -0.569** -0.511** 
 (0.174) (0.148) (0.212) (0.184) 
Share propios -0.458*** -0.293*** -0.572*** -0.439*** 
 (0.132) (0.104) (0.176) (0.135) 
Share dynastic opposition seats -0.003 0.004 -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.119) (0.109) 
Seniority  -0.097* -0.037 -0.055 -0.022 
 (0.051) (0.044) (0.051) (0.048) 
Voter turnout   0.834** 0.510* 
   (0.392) (0.287) 
Share MPs Art. 29    0.094 0.014 
   (0.107) (0.096) 
GDP per capita  0.476*  0.588** 
  (0.254)  (0.247) 
Population density  -0.035***  -0.039*** 
  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Literacy rates (lagged)  0.035**  0.029** 
  (0.012)  (0.010) 
School-age children over total pop.  1.313  1.095 
  (1.273)  (1.326) 
Older people over total pop.  4.118  2.504 
  (3.066)  (4.595) 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 945 945 617 617 
R-squared 0.653 0.753 0.754 0.814 
Note: The lack of data on voter turnout reduces the number of observations in regressions (3) and (4).  
All regressions include a constant. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The seniority of legislators shows a negative impact, but it is no longer significant once the 
control variables are included. Similarly, the share of dynastic opposition seats did not exert 
any statistically significant influence. Regarding the covariates, the results show that 
schooling investments were higher in richer, more literate provinces, as there is a positive 
and statistically significant effect of GDP per capita and lagged literacy rates. There was also 
a negative relationship between education expenditure and population density. This seems 
to confirm the claim of Pérez Moreda (1997) that schooling provision was higher in areas 
where small towns were predominant because of the way the Moyano Law was designed, 
since it required that at least one school be created in small towns. The rest of the 
demographic controls were not statistically significant. 
Column 3 includes voter turnout and the share of MPs elected through Article 29. The latter 
did not affect schooling investments, while voter turnout showed a positive and statistically 
significant effect. The share of minority MPs and propios held their influence. The results 
remained unchanged in column 4 when the controls were included. In terms of magnitudes, 
the impact of political variables in column 4 implies that a rise of one standard deviation in 
the share of minority MPs and propios would produce a 12% and 13% decrease in the 
standard deviation of schooling expenditure, respectively, a substantial variation. This 
translates to a total reduction of 0.21 pesetas per capita. The positive effect of voter turnout 
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did not countervail this negative impact, as it implied a 5% increase in the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable (equivalent to 0.04 pesetas). 
In Table 4, we tested whether a rise in the opposition made the government change its 
education investment strategy for the sake of political stability. Columns 1 and 2 allowed 
the impact of the share of minority and dynastic opposition MPs to change with the square 
of those variables with and without control variables, respectively. The estimates show that 
the increasing presence of minority parties did not change their negative effect on schooling 
expenditure (the square term is positive but not statistically significant). However, in the 
case of the dynastic opposition, the squared term turned positive and both coefficients were 
statistically significant.  
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 replicate the two previous computations, but now include 
voter turnout and the share of MPs elected under Article 29. The impact of political 
participation was again positive and significant. However, once we controlled for it, the 
positive influence of the share of dynastic opposition MPs was no longer significant, thus 
suggesting that it had perhaps captured part of the effect of voter turnout. In turn, in these 
specifications, the increasing presence of minority MPs maintained its positive sign, but this 
time it was also statistically significant. According to column 4, the net impact of minorities 
starts to be positive when they occupy more than 65% of the seats at the provincial level. 
This might reflect the fact that the government’s strategy of punishing constituencies that 
voted for minority parties prevailed over its attraction strategy until the share of minority 
MPs achieved a high threshold. The share of propios kept the same sign and influence shown 





Table 4. Impact of a rise in the opposition on primary education expenditure  
Dependent variable  Primary education exp. per capita (constant pesetas) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Share minority seats -0.825** -0.693** -1.015** -1.007*** 
 (0.362) (0.298) (0.401) (0.340) 
Share minority seats squared 0.395 0.307 0.673* 0.752** 
 (0.335) (0.280) (0.377) (0.321) 
Share dynastic opposition seats -0.590** -0.555* -0.569 -0.459 
 (0.274) (0.253) (0.352) (0.331) 
Share Dynastic opp. seats squared 0.820** 0.783* 0.795 0.648 
 (0.377) (0.352) (0.517) (0.486) 
Share propios -0.485*** -0.324*** -0.619*** -0.487*** 
 (0.130) (0.101) (0.174) (0.133) 
Voter turnout   0.791** 0.484* 
   (0.373) (0.269) 
Seniority -0.097* -0.041 -0.060 -0.029 
 (0.051) (0.044) (0.051) (0.048) 
Share MPs Art. 29   0.062 -0.019 
   (0.108) (0.098) 
GDP per capita  0.530**  0.665*** 
  (0.256)  (0.245) 
Population density  -0.035***  -0.037*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Literacy rates (lagged)  0.033**  0.029** 
  (0.012)  (0.011) 
School-age children over total pop.  1.839  1.294 
  (1.251)  (1.349) 
Elderly people over total pop.  4.154  2.630 
  (2.913)  (4.457) 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 945 945 617 617 
R-squared 0.660 0.758 0.760 0.820 
Note: All regressions include a constant. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As shown in Section 3, minority parties tended to grow more in urbanized and 
industrialized areas. This is because elections became increasingly competitive in industrial 
cities after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890. Therefore, the traditional 
political methods that were predominant in rural areas ended up coexisting with the 
modern political behavior seen in industrial cities (Moreno-Luzón, 2007). One might argue 
that the change in government strategy towards minority parties observed in the previous 
estimations could, in fact, be the result of an urban-rural effect, given the more competitive 
nature of elections in less rural contexts, instead of simply a response to the increasing 
threat from the opposition. To test this possibility, we introduced an interaction term 
between the share of MPs belonging to the opposition and the share of non-rural 
employment in each province in Table 5 to account for the differing nature of elections in 
less rural contexts.  
Column 1 shows the results after the non-rural employment interaction was included. We 
added the share of opposition MPs squared into column 2. In columns 3 and 4, we also 
included an interaction term between the share of minority seats and dummy variables for 
Madrid and Barcelona. This accounted for the fact that these two provinces were 
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disproportionately urbanized in the Spanish context, with non-rural employment rates 
above 60% from the beginning of the period, compared to the national average of 30%. 
Finally, column 4 reports the results after the rest of the political variables in our model 
were interacted with the share of non-rural employment. Regression results show that 
there was indeed a non-rural effect. The interaction term between the share of minority 
parties and the share of non-rural employment was positive and statistically significant in 
all estimates. The same interaction with the share of dynastic opposition seats rendered no 
significant effects. As for the share of minority parties MPs squared, this also remained 
positive, although it was statistically significant only in columns 3 and 4. Therefore, the 
regression results suggest that the increasing political representation of minority parties 
translated into increasing education spending, but that this effect was more pronounced in 
less rural areas. In other words, it seems that the government’s strategy of punishing 
constituencies that voted for minority parties gradually turned into an attraction strategy 




Table 5. Non-rural provinces and political determinants of primary education expenditure 
Dependent variable Primary education exp. per capita (constant pesetas) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Share minority seats -1.944*** -2.229*** -2.584*** -2.607*** 
 (0.621) (0.489) (0.659) (0.744) 
Share minority seats squared  0.576 0.741* 0.702* 
  (0.391) (0.391) (0.417) 
Share min. seats x sh. non-rural emp. 4.481*** 4.169*** 5.162*** 5.317** 
 (1.568) (1.351) (1.896) (2.175) 
Share dynastic opp. seats -0.150 -0.600 -0.600 -0.630 
 (0.279) (0.395) (0.398) (0.380) 
Share dynastic opp. seats squared  0.643 0.629 0.671 
  (0.490) (0.494) (0.485) 
Share dyn. seats x sh. non-rural emp. 0.551 0.566 0.609 0.650 
 (0.872) (0.892) (0.877) (0.837) 
Share propios -0.440*** -0.479*** -0.488*** -0.563** 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.140) (0.251) 
Share propios x sh. non-rural emp.    0.449 
    (0.817) 
Voter turnout 0.428* 0.411* 0.433 0.119 
 (0.255) (0.241) (0.258) (0.573) 
Voter turnout x sh. non-rural emp.    1.125 
    (1.932) 
Relative seniority -0.017 -0.022 -0.024 0.020 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.061) 
Relative seniority x sh. non-rural emp.    -0.133 
    (0.116) 
Share MPs Art. 29 -0.002 -0.027 -0.029 -0.043 
 (0.099) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) 
Share non-rural employment 0.163 0.129 0.107 -0.231 
 (1.310) (1.270) (1.284) (1.910) 
GDP per capita 0.278 0.367 0.228 0.211 
 (0.242) (0.248) (0.312) (0.300) 
Population density -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.044*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
Literacy rates (-10 lagged) 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
School-age children over total pop. 1.137 1.324 1.432 1.084 
 (1.419) (1.418) (1.414) (1.531) 
Elderly people over total pop. 2.522 2.580 2.600 3.633 
 (4.346) (4.257) (4.190) (4.353) 
     
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
R-squared 0.823 0.827 0.828 0.831 
Note: All regressions include a constant. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 3 and 4 
include interaction dummies for the share of minority seats and Madrid and Barcelona (not included for the 
sake of brevity). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As mentioned above, elections in more urbanized areas became increasingly competitive. 
The government lost its power to manipulate electoral results, particularly in big cities, and 
mass parties and modern political behavior gained ground at the expense of clientelist 
methods. It seems that it was in this context that the government decided to increase 
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education spending – i.e., a public good targeted at large segments of the population, 
presumably with high demand in urban areas – in search of electoral support. Conversely, 
in more rural areas, where the demand for education was probably lower and traditional 
political methods remained more effective, a given share of minority party MPs must have 
been less threatening to the government. However, it is important to note that the marginal 
effect of the share of minority party seats based on the estimations in column 3 (Table 5) is 
positive when the share of non-rural employment is above 49% (if we use the estimates in 
columns 1 and 2, this threshold is 45% and 52%, respectively). This condition was fulfilled 
only in Barcelona and Madrid, and then the Baleares Islands, Cadiz, Santander and Seville 
for a few years at the end of our time period. This again suggests that the punishment 
strategy was predominant. 
As for the share of propios, it is worth noting that this variable retained its negative and 
statistically significant effect across all estimates, even in column 4, when it was interacted 
with the share of non-rural employment. This suggests that propios did not have any 
incentive to struggle for education resources that would benefit both clients and non-
clients, regardless of the prevailing economic activities at the provincial level. In the case of 
voter turnout, the results show that this tended to be positive, but was no longer statistically 
significant when interacted with the share of non-rural employment. 
Finally, a note on the robustness of the results: one possible concern relates to the potential 
presence of spatial correlation or cross-sectional dependence among provinces. 
Unobserved common factors captured in the disturbance term and not correlated with the 
regressors might make the fixed effects estimators consistent but would not make the 
efficient and standard errors biased (Pesaran, 2004; Baltagi, 2005). We tested for the 
presence of spatial correlation, but found no evidence in this regard (see Table A.1 in the 
appendix). Additionally, in Table A.2, we controlled for possible heteroskedasticity and 
serial autocorrelation in the disturbance term. In Table A.3, we replicated our estimates 
with an alternative definition of schooling outlays (primary education expenditure per 
school-age child). In all cases, the main results held. 
6. Conclusions  
Just after the turn of the 20th century, Spanish policymakers devised an education reform 
to promote schooling expansion. Education was centralized in 1902 and the government 
took over the payment of primary school teachers’ salaries and the purchase of school 
supplies. Nation-building motivations undoubtedly explain the timing of this reform. It was 
introduced shortly after the resounding military defeat by the US and the loss of the last 
colonies in Cuba and the Philippines. However, the implementation of the reform was 
hindered by the political dynamics of Restoration Spain. To explore this subject further, we 
examined the allocation of government spending on primary education across Spanish 
provinces in 1902-1922, when the reform was implemented. 
Regression results show that education spending was negatively correlated with the share 
of MPs belonging to minority parties. However, this relationship was non-linear and turned 
positive for higher levels of minority party representation. The results also show that the 
government was more responsive to minority opposition representation in more industrial 
provinces, where elections were actually more competitive. This suggests that the lack of 
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effective political competition initially enabled the government to ignore voter demands in 
less loyal constituencies, which is consistent with the behavior expected of a semi-
democratic regime. However, as opposition increased, especially when this growth was 
concentrated in industrial cities, the government replaced its initial punishment strategy 
with one of attraction. Nonetheless, this positive effect occurred only in some specific 
provinces, with particularly high levels of minority party representation and non-rural 
employment, which would suggest that the punishment strategy predominated across 
provinces and over time. 
The share of propios (candidates with particularly strong clientelist ties to local elites) also 
shows a negative and statistically significant effect. This means that primary education 
outlays were smaller in provinces where political patronage was more widespread. 
Arguably, propios had little incentive to provide a non-targeted good, such as primary 
education, which would have benefited both their clients and non-clients. Finally, even 
despite the corruption, we found that voter turnout had a positive effect on primary 
education spending. The ruling elite were not completely immune to demands from below. 
However, this effect was not big enough to compensate for the negative impact of the lack 
of effective electoral competition and widespread political patronage. The 1902 reform, 
which centralized primary education, was not the direct result of pressures from below, but 
the political dynamics and democratic shortcomings of Restoration Spain limited its 
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Map 1 Literacy rates in Spanish provinces (1900) 
 
Source: Núñez (1992) 
 
Map 2. Literacy rates in Spanish provinces (1920) 
 
 





Map 3. Central government expenditure per capita on primary education in Spain (1905-
1920) 
 







Source: See Section 4 for data sources and details 
 

























Table A.1 Pesaran’s test for baseline results 
 
 
   
Baseline estimates T. 3 Col. 4 T. 4. Col. 4 T. 5. Col. 2 
Pesaran’s test for cross-sectional 
independence -0.161 -0.626 -0.841 
H0: cross-sectional independence  
Prob. 1.128 1.469 1.600 
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Table A.2. Baseline heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent results 
Dependent variable  Primary education exp. per capita (constant pesetas) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share minority seats -0.511*** -1.007*** -1.944*** 
 (0.160) (0.299) (0.443) 
Share minority seats squared  0.752**  
  (0.309)  
Share min. seats x sh. non-rural emp.   4.481*** 
   (1.165) 
Share dynastic opposition seats -0.007 -0.459* -0.150 
 (0.090) (0.239) (0.219) 
Share dynastic opp. seats squared  0.648**  
  (0.328)  
Share dyn. seats x sh. non-rural emp.   0.551 
   (0.708) 
Share propios -0.439*** -0.487*** -0.440*** 
 (0.115) (0.113) (0.116) 
Voter turnout 0.510** 0.484** 0.428** 
 (0.234) (0.223) (0.217) 
Share non-rural employment   0.163 
   (0.826) 
Seniority -0.022 -0.029 -0.017 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) 
Share MPs Art. 29 0.014 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
Controls  YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 617 617 617 
Note: Estimates consider Newey-West standard errors. All regressions include a constant and controls for GDP 
per capita, population density, literacy rates (lagged), school-age children and older people over total 

















Table A.3. Robustness checks. Alternative definition of primary education expenditure. 
Note: All regressions include a constant and controls for GDP per capita, population density, 
literacy rates (10 years lagged), school-age children and older people over total population. 
Column 2 includes interaction dummies for the share of minority seats and Madrid and Barcelona 
(not included for the sake of brevity). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 




Dependent variable  Primary education expenditure per school-age children 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share minority seats -2.029*** -4.003*** -7.801*** 
 (0.708) (1.337) (2.439) 
Share minority seats squared  3.004**  
  (1.311)  
Share min. seats x sh. non-rural emp.   18.109*** 
   (6.280) 
Share dynastic opposition seats 0.058 -1.668 -0.601 
 (0.427) (1.414) (1.084) 
Share dynastic opp. seats squared  2.477  
  (1.995)  
Share dyn. seats x sh. non-rural emp.   2.568 
   (3.601) 
Share propios -2.051*** -2.236*** -2.039*** 
 (0.568) (0.560) (0.586) 
Voter turnout 1.430 1.329 1.114 
 (1.291) (1.213) (1.171) 
Share non-rural employment   -0.013 
   (5.257) 
Seniority -0.195 -0.221 -0.182 
 (0.192) (0.189) (0.179) 
Share MPs Art. 29 0.167 0.035 0.108 
 (0.402) (0.404) (0.406) 
Controls  YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 617 617 617 
R-squared 0.814 0.819 0.822 
